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Brian Langille*

The Michelin Amendment In
Context

On Friday, December 28, 1979 an Act to Amend Chapter 19 of the
Nova Scotia Acts of 1972, The Trade Union Act, received Royal
assent. This piece of legislation is commonly (and much more
conveniently) referred to as the Michelin Bill, the Michelin Act or
the Michelin Amendment.' Its namesake is Michelin Tires
(Canada) Limited, the Canadian subsidiary of the large French
multinational radial tire manufacturer.
It must, and indeed it should, seem odd that a bill amending in
general terms an act of general application (the Trade Union Act of
Nova Scotia) 2 should bear the name of a manufacturing company
located in the province. But as seems to be admitted by all
concerned, there is a direct link between Michelin and the
amendment. Because the link has been openly admitted or alluded
to by the government which passed the amendment, much of what is
contained in this comment is not new or at all extraordinary. Also,
because it seems generally conceded that the handle "The Michelin
Amendment" fits, in large measure the issues surrounding the
Michelin Amendment are not labour law issues at all. The central
issue is one of fundamental economic, philosophical, and political
principle. To put it simply, the amendment has a great deal to do
with the basic political dilemma of trading fundamental, and in a
sense intangible, rights or freedoms for economic gains or increases
in the general economic welfare of an economically depressed area.
This is so much more important a question than any problem of
tinkering with technical labour law concepts such as "appropriate
bargaining units" and "community of interest" that it overwhelms
any attempted labour law analysis.
So, what reasons are there for wishing to discuss the Michelin
Amendment in labour law terms? First, there was an attempt to
justify the amendment in labour law terms - the term "broad based
*Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School. B.A., LL.B., B.C.L.
(Oxon). This paper was prepared for and presented in abbreviated form to the
annual meeting of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association at Montreal on
June 2, 1980. I wish to thank my colleagues, Innis Christie and Larry Steinberg, for
their comments.
1. The text of the legislation is set out in Appendix A.
2. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19 as amended by S.N.S. 1977, c. 70 and S.N.S. 1978, c. 34.
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bargaining" was bandied about in connection with the bill. This
analysis, however, was not used extensively by the proponents of
the legislation. Second, and more importantly, the Michelin
Amendment does raise basic and interesting labour law issues. In a
sense the Michelin Amendment goes to the heart of the most
modem thinking on bargaining unit theory developed by labour
relations boards in this country. And finally, the Michelin
Amendment is instructive in that it demonstrates the healthy
connection between apparently innocent and neutral concepts such
as "appropriate bargaining units" and fundamental political
principles and freedoms. It was once said that our substantive
due process lies buried in the interstices of procedure. This captures
part of what I am saying here. Manipulation of technical labour law
concepts can have profound effects upon substantive rights.
This comment attempts to accomplish two things. First, it
attempts to put the Michelin Amendment in context by filling in
some factual background. Simply laying out the facts goes a long
way to explaining my view of the central issue in the Michelin
Amendment controversy. Second, by drawing on some recent
developments in labour law it attempts to substantiate the assertions
that 1) the Michelin Amendment is directly related to much of what
has been said in recent years concerning bargaining unit
determination and 2) that there is a vital link between technical
concepts and fundamental political issues.
I. The Michelin Amendment -Background
Michelin Tire's first North American tire manufacturing plants went
into production at Granton, Pictou County and Bridgewater,
Lunenburg County, Nova Scotia, in 1971. Michelin Tire employs
over 108,000 employees in 48 factories in 15 countries. The news
of Michelin's decision to locate in Nova Scotia came in 1969 and
followed lengthy negotiations with federal, provincial and
municipal governments which concluded with a substantial package
of grants, accelerated depreciation benefits, tariff and duty
concessions, low interest loans, training grants, free plant sites, and
property tax reductions. 3 The figure commonly used to indicate the
financial value of the initial package is 81 million dollars in public
funds. 4 When Michelin went into production in Nova Scotia other
3. For a brief account of the negotiations leading to the Michelin location decision,
see Kimber, "Michelin Tire Rolls On", FinancialPost Magazine, April 26, 1980.
4. Ibid.
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tire manufacturers in the United States succeeded in erecting a
countervailing tariff against the import of Michelin Tires into the
United States on the basis that the benefits listed above gave
Michelin an unfair advantage.
Michelin is one of Nova Scotia's largest employers. Initially,
Michelin employed 1,300 workers but the work force has grown
(along with the plants) to a combined total at both plants of 3,600.
This represents over 7% of the province's employees engaged in
manufacturing. A third plant is now under construction. When
operational, Michelin's proportion of the manufacturing work force
will exceed 10%.
The two Michelin plants in Nova Scotia are functionally
interdependent. The nature of this interdependence has been
summarized by the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board in the
following Manner:
Michelin Tires (Canada) Limited has manufacturing plants at
Granton and Bridgewater, Nova Scotia, some 150 miles apart. At
the Granton plant all material for the making of rubber are
processed. At the Bridgewater plant steel cord for the metal
fabric used in making tires and steel beadwire, or trindle are
manufactured from raw material. Steel cord is sent from
Bridgewater to Granton where it is integrated with rubber to
make the metal fabric used at Granton for passenger car tires and
truck tires, and some of the metal fabric is sent back to
Bridgewater where it is made into tires for light commercial
vehicles. Beadwire is also sent from Bridgewater to Granton for
integration at a later stage of tire making.
This brief statement does not do justice to the full and
graphically illustrated explanation of the tire making process at
the two plants given by Mr. Gorce, Michelin Tires (Canada)
Limited's general manager in his testimony to the Board. But the
Board accepts that there is a high degree of functional integration
between the operations at the two sites. Rubber mixes, steel cord
and metal fabric are chemically and physically unstable products
until the final vulcanization of the tire. They must be transported
in special containers and if there is any delay in the process they
will deteriorate to the point where they become unusable. Thus,
stockpiling is not possible and a cessation of production at one
plant will bring the other to a halt in a matter of a day or two.
From the standpoint of production, the two plants should,
ideally, be part of one large complex. They are located 150 miles
apart in order to tap two separate labour pools. Various financial
incentives offered by the government were, apparently, granted
upon conditions which, to some degree at least, dictated the
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choice of two separate sites for Michelin's operations in Nova
Scotia.
Not .only are the production processes of the two plants
functionally integrated, management and administration are also
fully integrated, with Bridgewater being, in effect, a branch plant
of Granton. In one other respect, as well, there is a high degree of
integration: virtually all training of tradesmen and production
employees takes place at Granton.
In marked contrast, however, the evidence is that there is
virtually no interchange of production employees once they are
established in employment. There is some interchange of
maintenance employees but, measured against total man hours in
maintenance work, it is insignificant. The Respondent produced
lists of people who had moved from one plant to the other, mostly
to perform maintenance functions, but Counsel for the Union
succeeded in demonstrating through cross-examination and in
argument that there is no significant interchange in employees in
the bargaining unit. There is very considerable daily traffic
between the two plants at the management level, but it is with the
employees that we are mainly concerned here. 5
A. The Construction Projects Labour Management Relations Act
(1971)6
In late July, 1971 the Nova Scotia Legislature was called into an
emergency mini session. On June 28, 1971 the then Minister of
Labour, Leonard Pace, introduced An Act for the Stabilization of
Labour-Management Relations Affecting Certain Construction
Projects, the only legislation this session was to consider. At this
time both Michelin plants were under construction and there was
considerable difficulty in construction industry labour relations at
the sites. 7 There is no doubt that this rather comprehensive piece of
legislation was aimed at securing the completion of the Michelin
construction projects. The Act extended the terms of collective
agreements until new agreements were negotiated, 8 placed a 30 day
maximum time limit on strikes and then imposed interest arbitration
(if a majority of trades had concluded agreements), 9 otherwise
5. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local 1028
andMichelin Tires (Canada)Limited, [1979] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 429.
6. S.N.S. 1971 (2nd Sess.), c. 1. The Bill was given Royal assent on July 8, 1971.
7. See, for example, R. v. I.B.E.W., Local 1818 (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 607
(N.S.S.C. A.D.).
8. Supra, n. 6, s. 5.
9. Supra, n. 6., s. 7.
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banned work stoppages and picketing, 10 and established offences
with possible penalties of $1,000 a day for individuals and $10,000
a day for unions. 11
The Act applied only to industrial construction projects of a cost
or value exceeding 5 million dollars. 12 The Act was declared in
force only in Pictou County 1 3 which covers the Granton plant.
In the debates of the House of Assembly we find the following:
Mr. Pace (Minister of Labour): . . Now, Mr. Speaker, I would
suggest to the Honourable Members that legislation of this sort,
the Government does not intend to proclaim it in general, but
rather for the two particular situations which we have in which
there has been no attempt to make it a secret, the two Michelin
plants which are vital to the economy of this province, it will be
made applicable to those on proclamation ...
An Hon. Member: That is at Granton and Bridgewater.
Mr. Pace: At Granton and Bridgewater, and then, of course, we
will look for the experience over the next succeeding months, and
if, in fact, it is not necessary to proclaim it further, then, of
course, the government will not do so.
Mr. Veniot: If the Honourable Minister might permit a brief
question. Assuming that the Act is made applicable to Granton
and Bridgewater which are the two problem areas at the moment,
by virtue of clause (b) on page 14 that the Act can be suspended
or revoked by the Governor in Council I presume that's at any
time you wouldn't keep these regulations in effect either at
Granton or Bridgewater any longer than you had to, would you?
What is your feeling on that point?
Mr. Pace: Mr. Speaker, in answer to the Honourable Member's
question, this type of legislation is the type that no Government
wishes to pass and our Government certainly does not. But it is
aimed at a particular situation which is vital to the economy of
this Province in which the taxpayers of this Province have a vital
interest, and also where the majority of workmen on the site want
the right to have their day's work conducted and receive the pay
therefrom. Certainly we do not intend to make this an
all-encompassing thing in order to interfere with the regular
union and management relationships but in fact if the vital
interests of this Province and the workers of this Province are
involved, we will proclaim it for those particular purposes in
10. Supra, n. 6, s. 6.
11. Supra, n. 6, s. 9.
12. Supra, n. 6, s. 2(d).
13. Proclaimed July 15, 1971, 180 Royal Gazette 1515; reproclaimed due to
clerical error August 31, 1971, 180 Royal Gazette 1873.
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order to protect those vital interests. 14
As far as I can determine, the machinery set out under the Act
was never actually used and no agreement was never arbitrated
pursuant to its provisions.
B. New Regulations for Craft Units - 1973 (The Michelin
Regulations)
On May 10, 1973, the International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 968 applied to the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board to be
certified as bargaining agent for a unit of stationary engineers
employed by Michelin Tires at the Granton plant. A hearing was
scheduled for June 19, 1973 after an extension of time in which to
file a reply had been granted to the employer. A few days before the
scheduled hearing date the Governor in Council enacted a new
regulation which dramatically affected the course of the
proceedings. 1 5
Regulation 1 was fatal to the application of the Operating
Engineers. It effectively barred the certification of craft units in
industrial plants and the regulation was made applicable to
outstanding applications before the Labour Relations Board. It read
as follows:
1. (1) In considering any application herebefore or hereafter
made to the said Board under Section 23(1) of the said Act for
certification of a trade union as bargaining agent of the
employees in a group belonging to a craft or exercising technical
skills, and in determining whether the proposed group is
otherwise appropriate as a unit for collective bargaining and
whether the union should otherwise be certified, the Board shall
require to be satisfied:
(a) that no material community of interest exists between the
proposed group and other employees of the employer;
(b) that the industry in which the employer is engaged belongs
to a class of industry which traditionally or normally is
organized by craft unions pertaining to such respective crafts
or other skills;
(c) that the continued normal operation of the employer's
production process is not dependent upon the performance of
the assigned functions of the employees in the proposed unit;
(d) that the proposed group is more appropriate for collective
14. Debates of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 1971, Volume 3, p. 33-34.
15. Pursuant to s. 9 of the Trade UnionAct. 0/C 1973-580A dated June 14, 1973.
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bargaining than an employer, plant or subplant unit which
included the employees in the group.
(2) This section shall not apply to the construction industry, to
any non-commercial institution, or to any other industry that does
not produce or deal in goods or services on a commercial basis.
As a result of this development, the union obtained an
adjournment from the Board and sought a Writ of Prohibition to
prohibit the Board applying this regulation in the hearing of its
current application. 16 The union argued that the regulations were
ultra vires the Trade Union Act on two grounds: (1) that the
regulations altered substantive law enacted by the Legislature and
substantive rights of the union and (2) that the regulations were
retrospective in operation. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court rejected
these arguments and held that the regulations were intra vires.
As a result, the union's application was, of course, eventually
17
dismissed.
C. The Michelin Amendment - 1977-1980
In order to place the Michelin Amendment in context it is in my
view necessary to recount a rather lengthy story which begins in the
autumn of 1977. Although present before that time, the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America
(U.R.W.) then began a major drive to organize the Michelin plant at
Granton. Local 1028 was established. On December 9, 1977, the
U.R.W. filed the first of what would turn out to be a total of three
applications for certification regarding the production and maintenance staff at Granton. On January 25, 1978, after the usual
pre-hearing vote was conducted,' 8 the U.R.W. withdrew its
application upon receipt of the voters list, apparently realizing that it
did not have the required 40% of the unit as members in order to
have the vote counted in accordance with s. 24(7) of the Trade
Union Act. On February 15, 1978, a new organizing campaign
began. However, on February 29, 1978 the U.R.W. filed a
16. Re InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers, Local 908 andMichelin Tires
Manufacturing Company of Canada Limited. (1973), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 602
(N.S.S.C. T.D.).
17. L.R.B. order 2020, January 15, 1974. Another craft unit application by the
I.B.E.W. dated May 18, 1973 was withdrawn on August 21, 1973.
18. For an explanation of the history, thinking behind and working of the pre
hearing "quick vote" in Nova Scotia see Christie, "Certification - Is There A
Better Way to Test Employee Wishes?", in The Direction of Labour Policy in
Canada (Montreal: McGill U., 1977).
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complaint of unfair labour practices with the Nova Scotia Labour
Relations Board. The complaint alleged discrimination against
individual employees in contravention of s. 51(3) (a) of the Trade
Union Act and interference by Michelin with the representation of
employees by a trade union contrary to s. 5 1(1) (a) of the Act. These
complaints were related to activities of Michelin during both the
first and second organizing campaigns. In April the Labour
Relations Board began what would turn out to be 24 days of
hearings into these complaints. The hearings were conducted in
April, May, June, October and December, 1978 and January, 1979.
However, the pace of events began to quicken when, after 10 days
of hearings into the unfair labour practices, the U.R.W. filed its
second application for certification on June 30, 1978. It was agreed
that the evidence adduced at the hearing into the unfair labour
practices would be relevant to any determination in the certification
proceedings as to whether s. 24(9) of the Act should be applied. S.
24(9) empowers the Labour Relations Board to certify, despite the
loss of a vote, if the employer has contravened the Act in so
significant a way that the vote does not reflect the true wishes of the
employees. The usual pre-hearing vote was again conducted and a
total of fourteen days of hearings were held in October and
December, 1978 and January, 1979. The Labour Relations Board
issued no decision on either the certification application or the
unfair labour practices complaint until February 14, 1979.19
However the pre-hearing vote was counted in December, 1978. On
Wednesday, December 13, 1978 Mr. Thornhill, the Minister of
Development for Nova Scotia, rose in the House of Assembly to
make the following announcement:
Mr. Thornhill: And, Mr. Speaker, because some members of the
House have indicated a great interest in the vote that was taking
place yesterday by the workers at Michelin Tire, I have been
apprised of the vote at this particular time and the result is as
to
follows - those for certification, 434; those opposed
20
certification, 909. That is the official result of the vote.
On February 14, 1979 the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board
issued Order 2505. While technically an order only in the
certification proceedings, that order indicated the following:
1. That the U.R.W. had more than 40% of the appropriate unit
as members.
19. L.R.B. No. 2505.
20. Debates of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 1978-79, Volume I, p. 181.

The Michelin Amendment in Context 531

2. Implicitly therefore, that the Granton plant alone was an
appropriate unit.
3. That a majority had not voted in favour of the union.
4. That Michelin had committed unfair labour practices
(unspecified).
5. That the Board would not exercise its power under s. 24(9).
6. That the application was dismissed.
On April 11, 1979 the Board issued its decision in the unfair
labour practice complaint with extensive reasons. 2 1 The complaints
regarding individual employees were dismissed. However, the
Board found that Michelin had breached s. 51(1) (a) of the Act in
three respects which it outlined as follows:
1. By telling employees, in crew meetings and in meetings
between employees and management personnel that if the union
was certified, bargaining would begin at the legal minimum wage
and thereby, in the context, threatening the employees with the
loss of wages and benefits if they supported the union;
2. By sending letters to employees and their families and by
telling employees in crew meetings and in meetings between
employees and management personnel that the certification of
local 1028 carried the probability of a high incidence of strikes
and thereby threatening employees with a loss of income, and
perhaps jobs, if they supported the union; and
3. By imposing a no solicitation rule which effectively
prohibited the persuasion of people to become members of local
1028 on the employer's premises during non-working hours.
We have therefore hereby ordered the Respondent to cease and
desist from breaching Section 51(1) (a) of the Trade Union Act in
any of these ways.
The Board is empowered by section 55 of the Trade Union Act
To "by order, require the party to comply" with section 51 and
to make certain other orders to effect the reinstatement of
discharged employees and to award compensation for loss of
remuneration, but section 55 does not appear to grant the Board
the power to give the direction requested with regard to a letter
from the Respondent to its employees. In any event we22are
satisfied that our order in this respect will be well publicized.
No reasons were issued in connection with the certification
decision - Order 2505 - until August 6, 1979 when the Board
21. [197912 Can. L.R.B.R. 388.
22. Ibid. at p. 403.
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issued supplementary Order 2505.23 It was in these reasons that the
Board explained fully its decision, implicit in Order 2505, that the
Granton plant alone constituted an appropriate bargaining unit.
However, shortly after the issuing of the cease and desist order in
April the Michelin Bill (first version) made its appearance. The
proposed legislation was in fact never introduced in the House of
Assembly. However, the Minister of Labour, Ken Streatch, did
make it known that he was proposing an amendment which would
require a union seeking to be certified as bargaining agent for
employees of employers in the manufacturing industry to apply for
employees of all of a multi-location employer's plants. 24 The
proposed legislation was immediately dubbed the "Michelin Bill"
- a name which has since stuck. As reported in the Chronicle
Herald:
In an interview outside the House, Mr. Streatch allowed that
some people are calling the proposal a "Michelin Bill

. .

. and

maybe it is. They are certainly one of the most prominent
manufacturers who would fall into the category.' '25
Opposition to the proposed bill was swift. 26 Mr. Streatch publicly
defended the Bill in terms of "labour stability", "a stable and
reliable work force" and that this was "something to offer abroad".
He said it was an example of "broad based bargaining" similar to
reforms he had urged in the construction industry. 27 However, there
actually
seems to be some dispute as to whether Mr. Streatch
28
admitted that the bill was directed solely at Michelin.
One of the main aspects of the controversy surrounding the
23.[1979] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 429.
24. "Minister Wilt Seek Change in Union Act" - The Chronicle Herald,
Wednesday, April 18, 1979.
25. Ibid.
26. "Federation Opposed to Amendment" - The ChronicleHerald, Wednesday,
April 18, 1979.
"Labour Councils Meet to Protest Amendment" 23, 1979.

The Mail Star, Monday, April

"Arsenault Motion Would Stop Bill" - The Chronicle Herald, Thursday, April
19, 1979.
27. "Principle of Proposed Bill on Bargaining Unit Same - Streatch" - The
Mail Star, Monday, April, 23, 1979.
"Stable Work Force Key Asset - Streatch" - The ChronicleHerald, Tuesday,
April 24, 1979.
28. See Kimber, supra, n. 2 where it is alleged that Mr. Streatch said to members
of the Labour Management Joint Study Committee "Look, let's stop fooling
around, what if we wrote it just for Michelin?"

The Michelin Amendment in Context 533

proposed legislation was the manner in which the minister had
consulted with the Joint Labour Management Study Committee.
This committee of labour and management representatives
established under the auspices of the Institute of Public Affairs at
Dalhousie University in the early 1960's had in the past always been
consulted, had always studied and always vetted any proposed
changes in the province's labour relations legislation. The
committee was first informed of the Bill on the Thursday evening
before Good Friday, and told that the Minister intended to introduce
the Bill the following Wednesday. 2 9 There appears to be no
question that both caucuses of the committee objected to the degree
of consultation. The failure to consult the committee became, for
the time being, a focal point for objection to the proposed bill. 30
There were also objections from other employer interests in the
Province, particularly in the fishing industry, who perceived that the
Bill was drafted widely enough to draw their operations into its net.
In the end the Minister delayed introduction of the bill. The headline
in the Chronicle Herald of Wednesday, April 25, 1979 read:
"Streatch Delays Labour Bill - Legislation Going Back to
Committee for Study".
In fact, the proposed Bill itself was never returned to the Joint
Study Committee. Rather, because the labour caucus refused to
study the Bill per se, a larger question was referred to the
Committee for study. The Committee agreed to study the
relationship between broad based collective bargaining and full
employment in the Province. The Committee studied this issue and
ultimately reported to the Minister in September in the following
terms:
The Joint Labour-Management Study Committee cannot
conclude that the bill would promote full employment nor would
it encourage broadening of the collective bargaining base. The
difficulty with the bill is the fact that it does not address the
principle that the Minister enunciated in his letter of April 25th. It
29. I am indebted to Mr. Kell Antoft of the Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie
University, for this information concerning the role of the Joint Study Committee.
Mr. Antoft was chairing the Committee at the relevant times. For information
concerning the Committee generally see Henson, "The Nova Scotia Labour
Management Agreement," (1969), 24 Rel. Ind. 87.
30. "C.M.A. Supports Bill's Delay" - The Chronicle Herald, Wednesday,
April 25, 1979.
See also Surette, "Michelin Whistles. Cabinet Rolls Over" - Atlantic Insight,
July, 1979.
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would appear that the bill would have the effect of regulating the
certification process within industries having multiple plants in
the province, and the Committee has noted the fundamental
difference between broad-base certification and broad-base
collective bargaining.
The Committee suggests that the link between increased
employment opportunities and broad-base collective bargaining
is a tenuous and indirect one. The Committee feels that it would
be inappropriate to amend the Trade Union Act for the purpose of
making it31into a major vehicle for industrial development in the
province.
Meanwhile, the Labour Relations Board in August had issued
reasons for its decision in Order 2505, the order dismissing the
certification application issued February 14, 1979. The central issue
addressed in the comprehensive and lengthy decision was whether
the Granton plant alone was an appropriate unit or whether it was
inappropriate, because, as the employer argued, both plants at
Granton and Bridgewater ought to be included. The Board decided
that the Granton plant alone was an appropriate unit.-3 Also
discussed - and dismissed - was a preliminary objection made by
Michelin to the effect that the U.R.W. lacked status as a trade union
because the U.R.W. has supported countervailing duties against
importation into the United States of Michelin tires.
Also in August, 1979 the U.R.W. began its third campaign to
organize the Granton plant. However, Michelin did not observe the
cease and desist order of the Labour Relations Board dated April 11,
1979. Among other things, it continued to impose the nosolicitation rule in contravention of the Board's order. On
September 12, 1979 the U.R.W. requested the consent of the
Minister of Labour to initiate a prosecution of Michelin for violation
of the Board's order. 33 On September 19, 1979 Michelin
commenced an action to quash the decision of the Labour Relations
Board as it related to the finding of an unfair labour practice
concerning the no-solicitation rule. On September 24, 1979 the
U.R.W., having received no reply from the Minister to their request
for consent to prosecute, started an action for an injunction to
31. Supra, n. 29.
32. Supra, n. 23.
33. Trade Union Act, ss. 73, 83. Note that the Act contains no provision, similar
to those in the labour legislation of other jurisdictions, for filing of Board orders in
the Supreme Court. Breaches of Board orders have in the past been enforced by
prosecution.
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restrain Michelin from breaching the Board's order and continuing
to commit the acts to which the Board's order related. On the same
date an application for an interlocutory injunction was filed. On
September 28, 1979 Glube J. issued the interlocutory injunction
requested. 34 Michelin appealed this decision to grant an interlocutory injunction to the Appeals Division of the Supreme Court. The
appeal was heard on October 19, 1979. The U.R.W. still had
received no reply to its request of September 12 for consent to
prosecute.
On November 27, 1979 the Appeal Division dissolved the
interlocutory injunction granted by Glube J.35 The decision of the
Appeals Division has disturbing implications for no solicitation
rules. Still later the Supreme Court of Canada was to refuse leave to
appeal from this decision of the Appeals Division. 3 6 The U.R.W.
never did receive a reply from the Minister of Labour to their
37
request for consent to prosecute.
On October 23, 1979, the U.R.W. filed its third application for
certification at the Granton plant and the usual pre-hearing vote was
conducted approximately a week later.
It was, however, in December of 1979 that the Michelin
Amendment, as we now know it, was introduced into the Nova
Scotia Legislature and passed into law. These were, in a way,
exciting times. The Bill was a matter of high profile, intense public
debate. It seems to me to be impossible to convey an accurate
historical account of the Bill's stormy passage through the
legislature. I will attempt to touch on the highlights only. A crucial
point to remember, in appreciating the degree of heat generated
during this period was that the U.R.W. had completed an
organization campaign at the Granton plant - relying on the
decision of the Labour Relations Board that it alone constituted an
appropriate bargaining unit. The pre-hearing vote had already been
taken and the ballots, as yet uncounted, were in the hands of the
officials of the Labour Relations Board. The Board had not yet held
a hearing into the matter of the third application by the U.R.W. for
certification.
Although there was action within the Joint Study Committee
throughout the autumn, public notice was given in November, 1979
34. (1979), 35 N.S.R. (2d) 146
35. (1979), 35 N.S.R. (2d) 104

36. Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin, January 25, 1980, p. 10.
37. Conversation with Raymond Larkin, Solicitor for the U.R.W.
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that a revised version of the legislation, which had been proposed in
the spring, would be introduced in a December sitting of the
legislature. 38 It was clear that the basic idea in the legislation would
be to require that all manufacturing plants of one employer which
were interdependent be declared to be the appropriate bargaining
unit of employees of that employer. 39 It was also clear that the new
version of the legislation would be more narrowly drafted to
expressly apply to Michelin and that it would apply to the
application of the U.R.W. currently before the Labour Relations
Board.
Mr. Streatch again stated that the Bill "will help stabilize the
province's labour force and provide employees with job
security". 40 He again tied the legislation to industrial
development. 4 1 On Monday, December 3, 1979 Mr. Streatch
introduced Bill 98, An Act to Amend the Trade Union Act. 4 2 On the
same day news of a proposed third Michelin plant spread through
the province. The Chronicle Herald's headline of December 4, 1979
read "Labour Act Change Unveiled - Bill Coincides with Rumour
of Third Michelin Plant". 43 The rumours were confirmed the
evening following the introduction of Bill 98 when Mr. Thornhill,
Minister of Development, rose in the House to announce that
Michelin Tires (Canada) Limited would build a third plant in the
province and would also expand its facilities at Bridgewater and
Granton. 44 He added that this would mean "at least 2,000 direct
jobs" and that "the spinoff could amount to another 4,500 jobs"
and that this would reduce the province's unemployment rate by
some 20%. He outlined other benefits to the province as well.
The battle was on. One of the first victims was the Joint Labour
Management Studies Committee which collapsed with the resignation of the labour caucus. 45 The battle raged until the passage of the
38. "Bill Has Potential to Create Jobs" - The Mail Star, November 27, 1979.
39. Ibid. And see "Trade Union Act Changes Need Lengthy Consideration" The ChronicleHerald, November 28, 1979.
40. Supra, n. 38.
41. Ibid.
42. Debates of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 1979, p. 2858.
43. See also "Officials Mum on Michelin Reports" - The Mail Star, December
4, 1979.
44. Debates of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 1979, p. 2879.
45. "Labour Resigns From Committee" - The Cape Breton Post, December 6,
1979.
"Labor Caucus Resigns" -The

Mail Star, December 6, 1979.

As of this date the committee has not been resurrected.
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Bill on December 28, 1979. There were newspaper headlines, a
campaign against the legislation on radio and in the newspapers,
letters to the editor, massive crowds at Province House, a citizens
coalition against the bill, an emergency meeting of the Nova Scotia
Federation of Labour, and intense debates among the citizenry
across the province.
Upon rereadinig the debates in the House and elsewhere one is
struck by the absence of any discussion of the industrial relations
merits or lack thereof in the legislation. Although Mr. Streatch
denied that Michelin had requested the legislation 4 6 the debate on
both sides was pitched at a level in which the connection between
the legislation and U.R.W.'s application before the Labour
Relations Board was blatent. The argument was one about jobs and
"development" as reified in the proposed Michelin expansion.
Even more explicitly the government based its defence of the
legislation in part upon a direct attack upon the U.R.W. Both of the
government's leading spokesmen on the bill - Mr. Streatch and
Mr. Thomhill - adopted this approach. There was in effect a
two-pronged approach - a positive link to jobs and a negative
attack upon the U.R.W.
Mr. Streatch asserted that he believed in the principle of the Bill
which he stated to be that "this Bill stands for . . . trying to set an
environment where we can get jobs for Nova Scotians ". 4 7 He then
referred to the Michelin expansion announcement and added that he
was "very, very proud that I am a member of a government that is
prepared to set this type of a precedent to secure jobs and secure
employment in this province.' '48
Reference was then made to the U.R.W. 4 9 One of the points the
Minister made concerned the role of the U.R.W. in securing the
countervailing duties in the United States against Michelin imports
in 1972.50
Mr. Thornhill also attacked the U.R.W.'s motives in organizing
the Michelin plant at Granton. He also reminded the Liberal
46. "Company Didn't Ask for Amendments - Streatch" - The Chronicle
Herald, December 5, 1979.
47. Debates of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 1979, p. 2960.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. p. 2962.
50. Ibid. And see "Labour Minister Says Bill Aimed at U.R.W." - The Mail
Star, December 6, 1979 and "Legislation Directed at U.R.W. - Streatch" - The
Chronicle Herald, December 6, 1979.
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opposition of its passing of regulations in 1973 when it had been in
power. As well, he made the link with jobs and development:
We are simply and plainly taking measures to prevent
irresponsible interference with our growing economy. 51
The Premier, Mr. Buchanan, added:
Let me put it this way... when 5,000 possible jobs are at stake,
when the economy of the province is at stake, then I am not going
that
to start playing Russian roulette with 5,000 jobs and hope 52
Michelin will not go ahead if this Bill passes or does not pass.
There is very little in the debates about the specifics of the
legislation. Very little effort was expended in explaining the link
between jobs, in particular the Michelin expansion, and the
legislation. The Bill received Royal Assent on December 28, 1979.
On January 3, 1980 Michelin applied under the new provisions
for an order that the appropriate bargaining unit in its operations
consisted of both the Granton and Bridgewater plants. On March 4,
53
1980 the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board granted that order.
On the same date the U.R.W. 's third application for certification at
Granton was dismissed because, of course, the unit was
54
inappropriate.
The U.R.W. unsuccessfully applied to the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia for an order quashing the unit decision of the Labour
Relations Board under the new legislation. The argument was based
upon a problem with the transitional provisions in the legislation,
which I will deal with later.
Later in March, Mr. Thornhill listed the Michelin Amendment as
a "job creation" initiative of the Government. He stated that "the
Government of Nova Scotia had introduced legislation at great
odds, at great debate and at great personal sacrifice, which will
allow the Michelin Tire Company to expand its operations in Nova
Scotia".55
Labour continued its protest against the Michelin Amendment by
opposing Michelin's application for federal government funding for
56
the then proposed third plant.
51. Debates of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 1979, p. 3268.
52. Ibid. p. 3280.
53. L.R.B. Order 2604, (1980), 80 C.L.L.C. 16,026.
54. L.R.B. Order 2607.
55. "Job Creation Initiatives Included 'Michelin Bill' "-The ChronicleHerald,
March 12, 1980.
56. See "CLC Urges Michelin Not Receive Federal Funds" - The Chronicle
Herald, March 11, 1980.
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II. The Michelin Amendment and BargainingUnit Theory
The Government defended the Michelin Amendment by stating that
it would create an environment conducive to the creation of jobs,
particularly the expansion of Michelin within the province. Inherent
in much of what was said in defence of the Bill was that there was a
direct link between the Bill and Michelin's expansion. The link
could be of two sorts. It could be that Michelin would not expand
unless the province's Trade Union Act provided it with the secure
knowledge that if unionized the bargaining structure would be based
upon a single bargaining unit with the advantages that this would
provide. On the other hand, the link could be that the expansion
would not occur if Michelin were unionized at all. On this second
view, the purpose of the legislation was to gerrymander the election
constituency (after the vote had been taken) in order to prevent
unionization. Furthermore, the legislation guaranteed security in
that it would also make future attempts at unionization difficult.
Whichever view one takes, the link between Michelin and the
legislation was overt and admitted. Either of these two lines of
reasoning leads us straight into the heart of modem thinking about
bargaining unit theory. The current thinking on bargaining unit
determination demonstrates the link between the Michelin Amendment and the notion of broad based bargaining. The most interesting
developments in bargaining unit theory in recent years have dealt
precisely with the issues raised by both of these lines of reasoning
which may underlie the Michelin Amendment.
The starting point for this discussion is the realization that the
bargaining unit serves at least two functions. It serves as the basis
for the formation of a long term bargaining structure and it also
serves as the basis for organization. Combined with this has been
the realization that these two functions often pull in opposite
directions, the former in favour of large (broad based) units and the
latter in favour of smaller (easier to organize) units. The whole
struggle has been to reconcile these conflicting forces. In my view
the Michelin Amendment, depending upon one's view of its
purpose, either makes a serious (and unnecessary) error in resolving
"Michelin Not Deserving - Yetman" - The ChronicleHerald, April 30, 1980.
"Dark Day for Province if DREE Funds for Plant Halted by Lobby" -

The

ChronicleHerald, April 30, 1980.
"Spend 'Not Another Nickel' on Michelin, Ottawa Told" May 27, 1980.

The Globe andMail,
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this tension in bargaining unit determination or, recognizes this
tension and exploits it in order to prevent unionization of the
Michelin plants in Nova Scotia.
Before coming to the jurisprudence dealing with this tension in
bargaining unit determination and the relationship of the Michelin
Amendment to that tension, I would like to outline some
background on unit determination, particularly in Nova Scotia.
A. Background on Unit Determination With ParticularReference
to Nova Scotia
The Trade Union Act of Nova Scotia contains the following
definition of "unit":
"Unit" means a group of two or more employees and
"appropriate for collective bargaining" with reference to a unit,
means a unit that is appropriate for such purposes whether it be an
employer unit, craft unit, technical unit, plant unit or any other
the employees therein are employed by
unit and whether or not
57
one or more employer.
The Board's determination on the unit question is protected by s.
18:
If in any proceeding before the Board a question arises under this
Act as to whether:
(g) a group of employees is a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining;...
the board shall decide the question and the decision or order of
the Board is final and conclusive and not open to question, or
review, but the Board may, if it considers it advisable to do so,
reconsider any decision or order made by it under this Act and
may vary or revoke any decision or order made by it under this
Act.5 8
The Act also contains a direction to the Board concerning craft
units, which is not relevant to our discussion, 5 9 and as well, there
are the regulations of 1973 concerning craft units in industrial
enterprises 60
Uniquely the Act also attempts to give direction to the Board on
the issue of appropriateness. Section 24(14) states:
57. Supra, n. 2, s. 1(x).
58. Ibid. But see R. Ex. p. Municipal Spraying and Contracting v. Labour
RelationsBoard(Nova Scotia). [1955] 2 D.L.R. 681 (N.S.S.C. en banc) andR. v.
Labour Relations Board (Nova Scotia) and International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers,Ex. Rel. Ocean Steel & Construction(1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 449.
59. Ibid. s. 23.
60. Supra, n. 15 and text.
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The Board in determining the appropriate unit shall have regard
to the community of interest among the employees in the
proposed unit in such matters as work location, 6hours
of work,
1
working conditions and methods of remuneration.
This is the manner in which the Act addressed the issue of
appropriateness of bargaining units prior to the passing of the
Michelin Amendment.
The purpose of Nova Scotia's Trade Union Act is to establish a
mechanism whereby employees, through trade unions, may acquire
the right to bargain collectively together. The legislation does,
however, restrict employee freedom of choice in selection of
bargaining agents. 62 Each employee is not permitted to select his
own bargaining agent, nor are employees free to band together in
groups of their own selection. Rather, groups of employees who
wish to engage in collective bargaining are required to demonstrate
that they constitute a majority of a group of employees considered to
be an appropriate bargaining unit. The determination of what
constitutes an63 appropriate bargaining unit (and therefore what is
the constituency in which those in favour of collective bargaining
must demonstrate majority support) is left by the legislation to the
Labour Relations Board. 6 4 The role of the Labour Relations Board
in determining the unit question is both difficult and crucial. It is
difficult because of the wide variety and complexity of modem
industrial and other organizations. It is for this reason also that most
modem labour legislation does not attempt to structure the Board's
power. 65 It is a crucial determination because "the choice of a unit
may well constitute the decisive factor between unionism and
nonunionism". 6, This is a theme which is crucial to our discussion
of the Michelin Amendment and to which I shall return.
At the most basic level however it seems clear that since the
61. S. 24(14).
62. This limitation is well explained in the Board's decision on the unit question,
supra, n. 23.
63. Not the appropriate bargaining unit. See Michelin Tires (Canada)Limited,
supra, footnote 19 at p. 434. See alsoRoyalBank (Gibsons), [1978] 1 C.L.R.B.R.
326.
64. S, 24(4) and S. 18(1). See TransairLimited (1976), 76 CLLC 14,024 at
14,347. Compare, however, the provisions concerning voluntary recognition in s.
28. Also vital is the Labour Relations Board's attitude towards "agreed" units.
65. Morris, The Developing Labour Law, (Washington: Bureau of National
Affairs, 1970).
66. Abodeely, The N.L.R.B. and the Appropriate BargainingUnit, (Philadelphia:
The Wharton School, 1971), p. 1.
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object of certifying a trade union as exclusive bargaining agent for a
unit of employees is collective bargaining, the fundamental question
on unit determination must be - can this group of employees be
bargained for collectively? In order to answer this question the
ancient and venerable logos "community of interest" is wheeled
out. If employees have a sufficient community of interest, then they
can be bargained for collectively. As the British Columbia Labour
Relations Board put it
Accordingly the group on whose behalf this bargaining is to be
carried on should include only those categories of employees
whose interest can reasonably be reflected in one set of
negotiations and whose working conditions can be incorporated
in one document. If some groups differ greatly in background,
skills, nature of work, method of payment and so on, it may
prove difficult to accommodate their interest in one bargaining
unit. 67
Without belittling the importance or difficulty of community of
interest determinations, the lesson of experience seems clearly to be
that answering the question "do these employees have a sufficient
community of interest so that they can be bargained for
collectively" does not take us very far towards answering the
bargaining unit question in many types of hard cases. There are
many places to draw the line of community of interest in such cases.
Any one of a number of communities might fit the bill. The
emphasis of modem bargaining unit determination has moved away
from the community of interest question. The action is at a higher
echelon of policy making. It is from this level of discussion that we
must approach the Michelin Amendment.
B. The Modern Dilemma
Most of the important discussions of bargaining unit determination
do not satisfy themselves with a discussion of whether or not a
group of employees can be bargained for collectively, but rather,
having regard to important industrial relations considerations,
whether they should be declared to be an appropriate bargaining
unit. A bargaining unit determination may determine the structure,
scope, and availability of collective bargaining not only for the
employees within the unit, but for those employees left outside. The
decision on the bargaining unit scope must be sensitive to such
issues. The impact on other employees has been outlined as follows:
67. Insurance CorporationofBritish Columbia, [1974] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 403.
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. . . This certification decision not only has a considerable
impact upon the employer, as we shall see, but also has an impact
on other employees, both those who don't want any union and
those who prefer another union . . . Moreover, that impact can
be irreversible. If we follow the logic of pure freedom of choice
to its ultimate point, then every time a new group of employees
wanted to carve out a different bargaining unit and select a new
representative, this should be permissible. Right now that is not
the case and once an appropriate unit has been settled and
collective bargaining has begun, a strong presumption exists
against changing it. As new unions come in to organize
remaining segments of the employees, their certifications will be
erected around the original one. The result is often a chaotic
patchwork of bargaining units dividing up the employees of one
employer, a situation which it is almost impossible to rationalize
later on...
In sum, when the first group of employees in an enterprise turns
its mind to collective bargaining, its wishes cannot predominate
in the decision about its own bargaining unit. The choice it makes
has too much impact on the options of other interested parties.
The Legislature delegated it to the board to weigh and to balance
the various factors and then to make up its own
mind about the
6
proper boundaries around the bargaining unit. 3
In designing an appropriate framework for collective bargaining
by employees of an employer, labour relations boards have
identified and outlined reasons for favouring large units, including
all-employee units, and the competing reasons favouring a
bargaining structure of smaller units. In terms of structuring the
long term bargaining relationship, the current trend in unit
determination is towards larger bargaining units. In Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia the British Columbia Labour
Relations Board outlined several of the major reasons favouring
large all employee units as follows:
1. Administrative efficiency and convenience in bargaining.
2. Lateral mobility of employees.
3. Achievement of a common framework of employment
conditions.
69
4. Industrial stability.
The last factor was elaborated upon as follows:
Another factor favouring a single large unit is the objective of
industrial stability. If there is one union and one set of
68. Ibid. p. 406.
69. Ibid. p. 408-409.
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negotiations, then the risk of strikes has to be less than if there are
several unions negotiating separately. If there are two or more
units representing employees in an operation which is functionally integrated, then if one unit goes on strike, it will put the
employees in the other unit out of work as well (and even if they
have nothing to gain from a strike because they have already
signed their agreement). The two proposed units at I.C.B.C. are
interdependent in that sense . . . Of course, it is by no means

inevitable that there will be a strike just because a unit is created
for collective bargaining. However, it is true that if there are two
or more units, there is a greater risk of a strike than if there is only
one.70

In addition, in determining the best long term bargaining
structure, the Board must be careful to create a viable bargaining
unit. Small units may not possess sufficient economic strength to
bargain collectively in an efficient manner. Also, small units might
not be serviced adequately by trade unions. 7 1 As well, fragmenting
bargaining units offers the possibility of work assignment and
representational disputes between different bargaining units. There
are, of course, countervailing factors favouring less inclusive units
and more narrowly based bargaining. The most important of these
must be the risk that real divergencies of interest may be ignored
when large groups of employees are lumped together in one unit.
These divergencies of interest will not disappear despite the fact that
employees have been placed in a single unit. They may rather
manifest themselves in a number of ways including unofficial
industrial strikes. This appears to me to be the lesson to be drawn
from the English experience with very broad based bargaining. 72 It
is also the case that the higher the level of bargaining (the more
broadly based it is) the more remote, in a democratic sense, it
becomes for individual members. However, the trend in initial
bargaining unit determination cases and in cases dealing with
attempts to alter existing bargaining structures (the "carving out"
cases) 73 is clearly to favour larger bargaining units as promoting
stable long term collective bargaining relationships.
70. Ibid. p. 409. Of course, even if not functionally interdependent, unit
fragmentation may lead to disruption in other units if picket lines are observed. For
another case exploring the virtues of large all employee units see B.C. Ferry
Corporation, [1977] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 526.
71. Michelin Tires (Canada)Limited, supra, n. 23 at p. 437.
72. Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer's
Associations (The Donovan Commission) (London, 1968).
73. See, for example, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Pinawa), [1978] 1
C.L.R.B.R. 92 (C.L.R.B.).
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However, enchantment with large bargaining units has been
tempered by the realization that the bargaining unit serves a function
other than possibly setting out the basis for a long term collective
bargaining relationship. It is the basis for organization and, to put it
simply, the larger the unit the more difficult it is to organize. A
great focus of activity in recent years in bargaining unit theory has
been to attempt to recognize and reconcile the two conflicting
functions of bargaining units. If, in the name of long term rational
bargaining structures, large units are favoured the result may well
be that there is no bargaining at all because the units are impossible,
as a practical matter, to organize. As the Canada Labour Relations
Board put it:
The fundamental dilemma the Board confronts in each
certification application and bargaining unit dispute is that the
bargaining unit serves two basic purposes. It is the initial
constitutency which will decide whether an applicant union will
acquire representational rights to commence collective bargaining. It is also the basis for the bargaining structure that may
obtain in the future. This Board and other labour relations boards
recognize that in difficult cases, such as this one, any judgment
carries its cost. The freedom of choice of employees to group into
self-determined units or the most rational, long-term bargaining
74
structure is partially or totally sacrificed.
And in another case:
We must weigh the competing interest of establishing,
developing and continuing 'sane and healthy collective bargaining relationships' . . . on the one hand and 'making it possible
for employees to assert their rights' . . on the other hand. Often
these two objectives seem incompatible in many
circumstances, 75
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board posed the dilemma
in the following manner:
.. . there is a tension between the two uses of the bargaining
unit. On the one hand, the scope of the unit is the key to securing
trade union representation and collective bargaining rights for the
employees. Since this is a fundamental purpose of the Code, the
Board's definitions must be such as to facilitate organization of
the employees. On the other hand, that unit sets the framework
for actual bargaining for a long time into the future. A structure is
needed which is conducive to voluntary settlements without
strikes and to minimize the disruptive effects of the latter when
74. CanadianImperialBank of Commerce, [1977] 2 C.L.R.B.R. 99 (C.L.R.B.).
75. Saskatchewan WheatPool, [1977] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 510 at 519 (C.L.R.B.).
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they do occur. Unfortunately, the lesson of experience is that
these two objectives often point in different directions. 76
The battleground for the working out of this conflict in principle
has been in the retail chain store business, 77 fast food outlet
chains, 78 the banks7 9 and (in the United States) the insurance
industry 8 - all multi-location employer situations.
This story, as epitomized by the 1977 decision of the Canada
Labour Relations Board decision that a branch of a bank is an
appropriate bargaining unit, is now familiar to all. The recognition
that the unit determination may be the key to whether any collective
bargaining will occur at all has led the Labour Relations Board to
declare that smaller, single location, units are appropriate.
This brings us back to the Michelin Amendment. I have said that
depending upon one's view of the motives underlying the
legislation, it either makes a serious and unnecessary error in
reconciling the tension between the two functions of bargaining
units or, recognizes that tension and exploits it in order to render
organization extremely difficult. The Michelin Amendment, and the
Labour Relations Board's order made pursuant to it81 declare that
the appropriate unit consists of both the Granton and Bridgewater
plants. If we assume that the purpose of the amendment and the link
between it and jobs and development is that industry will be
attracted to the province because of the stable (broad base)
bargaining structures created by the labour relations board's
bargaining unit orders, then it seems clear that the legislation has
struck the balance between the conflicting tensions in bargaining
unit theory totally in favour of long-term industrial relations
stability at the expense of the other value at stake, the ability to
organize at all. Labour relations boards, in the cases cited above,
have been more careful in striking the balance. Broad base
bargaining units, including all-employee units, are imposed only
when the question of whether there will be any collective bargaining
76. InsuranceCorporationofBritish Columbia, supra, n. 67, p. 407.
77. See, for example, Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Limited, [1975] 1
C.L.R.B.R. 114.
78. See, for example, Ponderosa Steak House, [1975] 2 C.L.R.B.R. 10
(O.L.R.B.).
79. CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce, supra, n. 74. See also CanadaTrusto,
[1977] O.L.R.B.R. 330.
80, See Morris, supra, n. 65 at p. 234 and see Gorman, Basic Text (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1976) at p. 80-81.
81. Supra, n. 54 .
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at all is no longer an issue. 82 Where there is no history of collective
bargaining, the boards have taken this into account in their unit
determinations. As the British Columbia Labour Relations Board
put it;
There are certain types of employees who are traditionally
difficult to organize and there are some employers who are
willing to exploit that fact and stimulate opposition to a
representation campaign. If, notwithstanding these obstacles, a
group of employees within a viable unit wishes to have a union
represent them, this Board will exercise its discretion in order to
get collective bargaining underway. In that kind of situation, it
makes no sense to stick rigidly to a conception of the best
bargaining unit in the long term, when the effect of that attitude is
to abort the representation effort from the outset. 83
And as the Canada Labour Relations Board stated:
In widely organized industries, the emphasis is more on the
attainment of industrial stability, administrative efficiency and
convenience in bargaining, and a common framework of terms
and conditions of employment. When those industries were first
being organized smaller units were appropriate to facilitate the
achievement of collective bargaining, but now the concern is for
wider bargaining structures. This preference for wider bargaining
structures in organized industries has been given expression in
allowing multi-union and multithe enactment of procedures
employer bargaining... 8 4
The labour relations boards have gone further in multi-location
employer cases and created bargaining units which attempt to
balance the long term bargaining structure function against the
ability to organize question by lumping more than one location into
85
a unit where more than one location has been organized.
It would seem that the Michelin Amendment overlooks these
countervailing reasons for declaring one location alone to be an
appropriate unit.
Because there is no certified bargaining agent at either of
Michelin's plants the subject matter of the legislation has to do with
broad based certification - not broad based bargaining. This error
may be an unnecessary one. Recent developments in bargaining unit
82. See Insurance Corporationof British Columbia, supra, n. 67 and the British
Columbia FerryCorporation,supra, n. 70.
83. InsuranceCorporationofBritish Columbia, supra, n. 67 at p. 407.
84. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, supra, n. 75 at p. 519-20.
85. Original Dutch Pannekoek House Limited, [1979] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 212
(B.C.L.R.B.).
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determination in British Columbia demonstrate that it may be
possible to reconcile the two functions of a bargaining unit in a most
interesting way. It may be possible to both ensure that organization
takes place and a broad based and stable bargaining structure results
for collective bargaining purposes. It may be possible to have your
cake and eat it too. How is this achieved?
In Amon Investments Limited,86 the employer had 13 locations
within Victoria and Vancouver. The union applied for a unit at one
location. The employer, of course, urged that the appropriate unit
was one consisting of all thirteen locations, relying on the reasons
87
set out in the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia case
favouring large units and stable unfragmented bargaining relationships. The union naturally relied on the Woodward Stores
principle8 8 asserting that a single location was appropriate in order
to permit collective bargaining to take place. After reviewing the
evidence and the countervailing pressures, the Board concluded that
a single location was an appropriate unit but went on to add the
following crucial qualification:
This conclusion does not, as we have previously hinted, require
that we ignore the concerns expressed by counsel for the
Employer with regard to the potentially inconvenient and
disruptive consequences of a fragmentation of the employees into
a number of bargaining units. We return again to the Woodward
Decision. In granting the Bakery and Confectionery Workers
International Union of America, Local 468, certification for a
unit comprised of bakery employees at only three of the several
stores in which the employer in that case operated a bakery, the
board added:
If and when the union organizes the employees at the other
locations, the Board will enlarge the existing bargaining unit
to include them.
We consider the same kind of qualification to be appropriately
added to the certification the board has granted the Union for the
employees ...the effect of this qualification is to confine the

number of bargaining units to only one. Any union other than the
[applicant] seeking to represent employees of this Employer will
be required to gain the support of those employees already
represented by the [Applicant]. Further certification applications
received from the [Applicant] (and there is one pending at this
time) will, if the union has the required support, be disposed of
86. Decision 39178 (B.C.L.R.B.).
87. Supra, n. 67.
88. Supra, n. 77.
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by enlarging the existing unit rather than creating a new
additional unit.
Our decision to uphold the present certification, subject to the
proviso that future organization of the employees must be
accomplished by a variance of the presently certified unit, serves
to allow the employees who now desire collective representation
to exercise their rights and, at the same time, accommodate the
employer's concerns. 9
What I refer to as the "Amon Principle" in my view successfully
achieves a reconciliation of the conflicting purposes of the
bargaining unit. It enables organization to take place while at the
same time ensuring that an unfragmented and thus stable and broad
base bargaining structure results in the long run. The Amon
Principle is also discussed in the Woodward Stores90 and the
OriginalDutch Pannekoek House Limited 9 ' cases.
If the legislature has determined that long-term stable and broad
base bargaining structures are crucial in multi-location manufacturing plants, then it seems to me that the "Amon Principle" could
profitably be invoked to ensure that that end is achieved without
totally ignoring the other function of bargaining unit determination.
But there is one feature of the Michelin case which separates it
and makes it a more difficult case than those which we have been
discussing. The overwhelming majority of cases involving
multi-location employers involve retail chains, fast food outlets,
and banks. There is little jurisprudence concerning the manufacturing industry. 92 But more especially there is little jurisprudence on
functionally interdependent operations. The chain store, fast food
outlet and bank cases are distinguishable because the locations
there, although they may be dependent upon other parts of the
employer's organization to continue to operate, are not functionally
interdependent. 93 The operations of Michelin Tire's two plants in
Nova Scotia are unquestionably interdependent as was explained by
94
the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board.
Labour relations boards in Canada have been sensitive to the
89. Amon Investments Limited, supra, n. 86, at p. 20-21.
90. Supra, n. 77.
91. Supra, n. 85.
92. This is also the case in the United States - see Morris, supra, n. 65 at p. 233
where he refers to the "near vacuum of Board policy in manufacturing" as
compared to the retail industry.
93. See Gorman, supra, n. 80, atp. 70 and Abodeely, supra, n. 66 at p. 39-40.
94. Supra, p. 4-5.
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issue of interdependence. In Insurance Corporation of British
Columbia, the British Columbia Labour Relations Board drew
attention to the fact that industrial stability was particularly
vulnerable in cases where employees in an operation which is
functionally integrated were divided into two or more units .95
In Woodward Stores the Board stated:
There may be occasions when operations at separate locations are
so closely intertwined that legal work stoppages at one will cause
such serious dislocation to the activities of the other
96 that a single
bargaining unit is the only reasonable conclusion.
The Canada Labour Relations Board in the CanadianImperialBank
of Commerce case distinguished the British Columbia Ferry
Corporation case and other cases partly on the basis that the
operation of bank branches were not interdependent:
The first distinguishing feature of these cases is that the unions
applying for certification define their units in occupational terms.
The future results of such a certification would have been that,
when these employees withdrew their services, the employer's
entire operation could be shut down because the occupations
sought were employed in integrated operations employing several
occupations. A cessation of work by one occupation could
disrupt the entire system. This is not the case here where the unit
sought is multi-occupational at a single location. A cessation of
work at one location would not prevent the bank at its many other
locations from continuing to97operate. It would be essentially
self-contained within the unit.
The thrust of these discussions is that because of the Board's
interest in long range industrial stability, functional interdependence
is an important element in unit determination. Certifying separately
a number of units which are functionally interdependent would lead
to instability. Although not well articulated in the House of
Assembly Debates, Michelin Tire itself took this argument one step
further. It argued 9 8 that because of functional interdependence a
fundamental question of democracy arose in the attempted
unionization of Michelin's plants. The focus was not upon the long
term but upon the present. The argument was not based upon
industrial stability in the future but rather upon a present question of
95.
96.
97.
98.
The

Supra, n. 67 at p. 409.
Supra, n. 77, at p. 122.
CanadianImperialBank of Commerce, supra, n. 74 at p. 123.
Through its then General Manager, Mr. Jean Gorce, in a full page interview in
ChronicleHerald, May 3, 1979.

The Michelin Amendment in Context 551

fairness. Because a strike at Granton would put employees at
Bridgewater out of work, it would be undemocratic to allow only
those employees at Granton to vote upon a decision which would
have such an impact on employees at both plants. In abstract form
there is certainly merit in this contention. 99 However, there are
several problems with this contention as well. First, functional
interdependence is pervasive in modem industrial society and
crosses employer lines. This was well explained by the Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board in the Michelin unit decision:
While the interdependence of the Granton and Bridgewater plants
is physically demonstrable to a somewhat unusual degree, it is
not uncommon for separate operations of the same employer to
be heavily dependent upon one another in an economical sense.
Thus, a fish plant cannot operate without supplies of fish and a
retail outlet cannot operate if there are no shipments from the
warehouse. Nobody can fail to be aware of how dependent
economic units in today's world are on each other, even where
they are not owned by the same employer, but these facts of
economic life have never been held to dictate single provincewide bargaining units. ' 0 0
Secondly, there is a fundamental problem with this argument from
democracy in that it too ignores the basic dilemma faced by labour
relations boards in unit determinations. While in some sense it
might seem abstractly more democratic to consult all employees at
the outset, this ignores the real pragmatic difficulties confronting
trade unions in organizing very large bargaining units, especially in
the face of an organized employer campaign against unionization.
The abstract appeal to the merits of democracy rings very hollow
where there is no real equal opportunity to convey information and
to consult all sides of the question.'10 This has particular relevance
in Michelin's case where the no solicitation rule is still in force. As
John Rawls put it inA Theory ofJustice:
Historically one of the main defects of constitutional government
has been the failure to ensure the fair value of political liberty.
The necessary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they
never seem to have been seriously entertained. Disparities in the
distribution of property and wealth that far exceed what is
compatible with political equality have generally been tolerated
by the legal system. Public resources have not been devoted to
99. The argument is well put by Abodeely, supra, n. 66 at p. 39-42.
100. Michelin Tires (Canada)Limited, supra, n. 23 at p. 440-41.
101. See Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974),
especially p. 105-135.
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maintaining the institutions required for fair value of political
liberty. Essentially, the fault lies in the fact that the democratic
political process is at best regulated rivalry; it does not even in
theory have the desirable properties that price theory ascribes to
truly competitive markets. Moreover, the effects of injustices in
the political system are much more grave and long lasting than
market imperfections. Political power rapidly accumulates and
becomes unequal; and making use of the coercive apparatus of
the state and its law, those who gain the advantage can often
assure themselves of a favoured position. Thus iniquities in the
economic and social system may soon undermine whatever
political equality might have existed under fortunate historical
conditions. Universal suffrage is an insufficient counterpoise; for
when parties and elections are financed not by public funds but
by private contributions, the political forum is so constrained by
the wishes of the dominant interests that the basic measures
just constitutional rule are seldom seriously
needed to establish
02
presented.
It seems to me that the labour relations boards in striking the balance
that they have achieved between the two functions of the bargaining
unit are seeking to ensure a fairer degree of political equality.
It also seems to me that the "Amon Principle" 10 3 also removes
the potency of the argument from democracy. In the end all are
consulted and in a meaningful manner without the sacrifice of long
term stability.
The American jurisprudence also supports the view that the
Michelin Amendment has struck the wrong balance between long
term stability and employee freedom of organization, even taking
into account the functional integration of the operations. While
recognizing the importance of functional integration 10 4 the
N.L.R.B. presumes that a single location is an appropriate unit. 15
Furthermore it has found as appropriate a single plant location even
when that plant is functionally integrated with another plant
belonging to the same employer geographically 20 and 30 miles
distant. 106 In these cases the N.L.R.B. expressly referred to the lack
of bargaining history at both of the plants and the lack of an
application from the union for the larger unit.
It is, of course, entirely possible that even if the "Amon
102. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1971), p. 226.
103. Supra, n. 86.
104. PotterAeronautical(1965), 155 N.L.R.B. 1077.
105. Dixie Bel Mills (1962), 139N.L.R.B. 629.
106. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company (1964), 147 N.L.R.B. 825 and
Welsh Company (1964), 146 N.L.R.B. 715.
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principle" was invoked in the Michelin context, that one plant
might be successfully organized and the other not. In fact in
connection with the two Michelin plants in Nova Scotia there is a
body of opinion that the Granton plant might prove significantly
easier to organize than the Bridgewater plant. While Granton and
Bridgewater are 150 miles apart physically, they are considered by
many to be even further apart psychologically. Pictou County has an
established heavy secondary manufacturing and mining industry
and a significantly larger number of organized workers than does
Lunenburg County. As well, that portion of the province is closer to
Cape Breton and shares its tradition of unionism. None of this is
true of Lunenburg County where the Bridgewater plant is located.
Whether or not this crude sociology carries any weight, there is a
possibility that one interdependent plant might be organized and the
other not. This, it seems to me, would not create any more
instability than if both were organized and in the same unit. And as I
have attempted to show, such a result would certainly not be in any
sense undemocratic.
C. The Text of the Michelin Amendment
The final irony concerning the Michelin Amendment is that despite
an overwhelming legislative history indicating its purpose, the
actual wording of the amendment is unclear. Although the Nova
Scotia Labour Relations Board and Supreme Court found that the
amendment did apply to Michelin, 10 7 it is ironic that there should be
any room for doubt as to the application of the provision to Michelin
Tires (Canada) Limited. The difficulty is located in the transitional
provisions. It should be noted, however, that the amendment sets
out a separate procedure for unit determinations under its
provisions. An employer with integrated manufacturing plants must
make a separate application for a unit determination. ' 0 8 The issue is
not left to be decided as certification applications are filed. The
amendment does not apply to integrated operations of which any
part is covered by an existing certification order or voluntary
recognition agreement. 10 9 The amendment then, not very clearly,
attempts to establish a one year time limit for applications. If an
employer had integrated manufacturing operations existing in the
107. Supra, n. 53, and the unreported decision of Burchell J. dated November 20,
1980.
108. S. 24a(2) (3).
109. S. 24a(6).
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province at the time of amendment, it must apply within one year of
the enactment.' 1 0 If an employer creates new interdependent plants
in the future, then he has one year to make an application from the
date of commencement of production.
The difficulty is that the language of the amendment is couched in
negative terms. Furthermore, the relationship between subsection 4
and subsection 5 is mysterious in the extreme. They read as follows:
(4) Subject to subsection (6) an application for an order pursuant
to this Section may not be made by an employer more than one
year following the commencement of production
(a) at the second manufacturing location in the Province of the
Employer, claimed by the Employer to be an interdependent
manufacturing location with the original manufacturing
location of the Employer in the Province; or
(b) at any additional manufacturing location in the Province of
an Employer already affected by an order issued pursuant to
this Section.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (4), an application for an order
pursuant to this Section by an employer respecting operations at
interdependent manufacturing locations in the Province at the
time this Section comes into force may not be made more than
one year following the date on which this section comes into
force.
At the very least the statute is very unhappily drafted. There is,
surprisingly, an argument that any application by Michelin Tires is
out of time. It is, and will always be, out of time by subsection 4.
The question is whether it is saved by subsection 5. It is not clear
that subsection 5 does so. On the other hand, the intent of the
legislation is abundantly clear.
III. Conclusion
The Michelin Amendment was not regarded by either its proponents
or its opponents as raising technical issues of labour law. In this
they were correct. On the other hand, the larger issues which were
at stake were precipitated by tinkering with labour law concepts.
Insofar as it is possible or useful to regard the Michelin Amendment
as a labour law issue the Amendment does flow against the current
of modem thinking on the issue of unit determination. The fact that
there is some ambiguity (at the very least) with the transitional
provisions is a bizarre footnote to the whole affair.
110. S.24a(5).
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APPENDIX
An Act to Amend
Chapter 19 of the Acts of 1972,
the Trade Union Act

Be it enacted by the Governor and Assembly as follows:
I Chapter 19 of the Acts of 1972, the Trade Union Act, as
amended by Chapter 70 of the Acts of 1977 and Chapter 34 of the
Acts of 1978 is further amended by adding immediately following
Section 24 thereof the following Section:
24A
(1)

In this Section,

(a) "'manufacturing" means the making of
goods by hand, by machinery or by a combination of
processes; and
(b) "interdependent manufacturing location"
means a manufacturing location of an employer in the
Province, the continued operation of which is
primarily dependent on the continued normal operation of another manufacturing location or manufacturing locations of the employer in the Province.
(2) An employer claiming to be engaged in
manufacturing and carrying on its operation at two or more
interdependent manufacturing locations in the Province may
make application to the Board for a determination that the
unit appropriate for collective bargaining is the unit
consisting of all employees of the employer at all such
interdependent manufacturing locations, subject only to the
exclusion of such positions as the Board may determine
would otherwise normally be excluded.
(3) Where, upon receipt of an application pursuant
to subsection (2), the Board is satisfied that

556 The Dalhousie Law Journal

(a) an employer is engaged in manufacturing; and
(b) the employer carries on operations in the
Province at two or more interdependent manufacturing
locations,
the Board shall determine and order that the unit appropriate
for collective bargaining is the unit consisting of all
employees of the employer at all the locations determined
by the Board to be interdependent manufacturing locations
subject only to the exclusion of such positions as the Board
may determine would otherwise normally be excluded.
(4) Subject to subsection (6) an application for an
order pursuant to this Section may not be made by an
employer more than one year following the commencement
of production
(a) at the second manufacturing location in the
Province of the employer, claimed by the employer to be an
interdependent manufacturing location with the original
manufacturing location of the employer in the Province; or
(b) at any additional manufacturing location in the
Province of an employer already affected by an order issued
pursuant to this Section.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (4) an application
for an order pursuant to this Section by an employer
respecting operations at interdependent manufacturing
locations in the Province at the time this Section comes into
force may not be made more than one year following the
date on which this Section comes into force.
(6) No application may be made for an order
pursuant to this Section where a certification order has been
made or voluntary recognition granted pursuant to this Act
with respect to one or more of the interdependent
manufacturing locations.
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(7) Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (6), where
any trade union makes an application for certification the
Board shall give to the employer adequate opportunity to
make an application pursuant to this Section before
proceeding to determine the appropriate unit.
(8) This Section applies to all applications made
pursuant to Section 22 which are before the Board at the
date this Section comes into force or which are made after
this Section comes into force.
(9) Section 24 shall, except where inconsistent with
this Section, continue to apply.

